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So Hard to Digest? 
Andrew Anderson 
This study began as an attempt to clarify for myself what it is that 
makes the seventeenth chapter of Arnold Schoenberg's Harmonielehre 
so ... well, peculiar. Since my first readings of this work as a whole, 
the chapter bearing the title' "Non-Harmonic' Tones" seemed to stand 
out from those surrounding it, prompting such questions as: What sets 
it apart from the other chapters? Why am I so uncomfortable with it? 
Is the material to be taken seriously? I attributed my feelings to such 
reasons as the vitriolic tone (even though this tone is present throughout 
the book); the long stretches of prose with no musical examples (even 
though there are other chapters containing longer stretches); or some 
degree of disorganization in the argument (even though it is by no 
means certain that this is actually a characteristic of the section). 
These somewhat superficial questions and their mostly 
unsatisfactory answers which formed the basis for my approach soon 
gave way to a set of potentially more interesting ones. My 
dissatisfaction with the organization of the opening section of the 
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chapter! soon gave way to questions concerning how the discourse is 
structured, while my superficial regard for the tone of the section 
changed into the more pertinent question of how Schoenberg expresses 
his ideas, and how this relates to the expression of ideas in any 
discipline. Finally, my concern over the page-after-page of text with no 
musical examples yielded to concern over some places where musical 
examples do appear. What follows is a discussion of structure, 
rhetorical status, and use of musical examples and some ways in which 
these factors propel this section of Harmonielehre. 
The Structure of Chapter 17 
In many other sections of the text, the structure is more or less 
transparent, hence easily outlined; but Chapter 17 seems to resist 
outlining. This refusal of the text to conform to a shape imposed upon 
it from the outside should certainly not be construed as an indication of 
structural inadequacy, but rather of structural idiosyncrasy. One factor 
which contributes to the structure of the section is the predominance of 
a semi-dialogical element-semi-dialogical because the explicit back-
and-forth structure that we find in the dialogues of Plato, for instance, 
is often submerged in Schoenberg's text. The chapter's first four 
paragraphs provide an example. In the first, he presents his own case 
in the form of a paradox: 
Harmony, its theory, its pedagogy, is concerned with non-
harmonic tones! But non-harmonic matters have as little 
11 will confine my discussion, as much as possible, to the introductory section of the 
seventeenth chapter, since the change in tone, manner of presentation, etc., between the 
opening section and the pedagogical section serves to set the introduction off as 
something like a chapter unto itself. Henceforth, then, all terms such as "the chapter," 
or "Chapter 17," or any such references to the chapter that deals with non-harmonic 
tones, should be taken to refer to the introductory pages of the chapter, pp. 309-31 of 
the Carter translation: Arnold Schoenberg, Theory of Hannony, trans. Roy E. Carter 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). 
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place in a textbook of harmony as do non-medical matters 
in a textbook of medicine. 2 
3 
In the next paragraph, the opposition's case is introduced by 
Schoenberg himself, with the formula, "[es] solI sein ... " (' 'it is said 
to be ... ," or, "it claims to be ... "); and in the following two 
paragraphs, he simply reiterates the exchange. Schoenberg restates his 
case, eliminating the paradoxical element, and again speaks for the 
opposition with the same formula ("es solI sein ... "). 
The next several paragraphs maintain this exchange in a slightly 
modified form. Schoenberg continues to speak for the opposition, but 
the formula from the previous paragraphs is dropped, and in its place 
we find other phrases indicating a mock-serious consideration of the 
other's views. For instance, after providing a concise statement of the 
opponent's case, he adds a curt "There you have it!". 3 After a short 
interval during which he turns the opposition's evidence against itself, 
a further and more subtle instance of this kind of ventriloquism occurs: 
Thus it is most unclear what such a chord might be in 
reality, since the faculty for producing coherence, for 
evoking progressions, is given as a possibility of our 
technique rather than of the nature of the chord itself. 4 
2Theory of Harmony, 309. "Die Harmonielehre, die Lehre von den Harmonien, 
befaBt sich mit harmoniefremden T6nen! Harmoniefremden Angelegenheiten geh6ren 
doch so wenig in ein Lehrbuch der Harmonie wie medezinfremde . . . in ein Lehrbuch 
der Medezin." Arnold Schoenberg, Harmonielehre (Austria: Universal edition, 1922), 
372. 
3The German has the much more curt (kurz?) "Also!". See Harmonielehre, 376; 
Theory of Harmony, 312. 
4Theory of Harmony , 312. "Es ist also hochst unklar, was eigentlich in Wirklichkeit 
ein solcher Akkord sein soll, da die zusammenhangbildende Fahigkeit, Folgen zu 
provozieren, sich eher als eine M6glichkeit unserer Technik als seines Wesens darstellt 
... " Harmonielehre, 377. 
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It is as if the author is speaking with two voices, as if he is expressing 
his own doubts from within the other's position. 
The ensuing section drops the back-and-forth strategy used 
hitherto and focuses upon aspects that might distinguish what is a chord 
from what is not; namely: (1) the historical development of the system; 
(2) the treatment of the structures as they are found in the literature; 
and (3) the influence of the graphic representation of the structures. 5 
Following this, Schoenberg confines himself to stating his own case in 
rather traditional fashion, at least for a time. 
The semi-dialogical element returns, however, when the question 
of beauty arises: 
But now comes an objection capable of knocking down 
everything I have established: namely, 'such harmonies are 
not beautiful.' Yes, unfortunately, it is true; they are not 
beautiful. The unhappy truth is that the great masters 
themselves have not shied away from writing passages of 
which the least among aestheticians can so easily declare: 
They are not beautiful. 6 
This ironic concession achieves its effect in much the same way as did 
a previously mentioned section in which Schoenberg states his case 
from within his opponent's territory, so to speak. 
The foregoing discussion of some rhetorical gestures serves to 
introduce a comparison of this chapter to the genre of diatribe. Stanley 
Stowers aptly summarizes the scholarship on the subject in the first 
5Harmonieiehre, 377; Theory of Harmony, 313-17. 
6Theory of Harmony, 323-24. "Aber nun wird mir ein Einwand gemacht, der 
imstande ist, alles zu schlagen, was ich bisher nachgewiesen habe; namlich, 'derartige 
Zusammenklange sind nicht schon.' Und da muB ich sagen: ja, leider, das ist wahr, sie 
sind nicht schon. Das ist ja Traurige an der Sache, daB selbst die groBen Meister sich 
nicht gescheut haben, Stellen zu schreiben, von denen der kleinste A.sthetiker so leicht 
behaupten kann, daB sie nicht schon sind." Harmonieiehre, 391. 
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chapter of his dissertation,7 and since I intend only to draw parallels, 
I will not rehearse all of the characteristics of the genre. 
One striking parallel between the diatribe and Chapter 17 of 
Schoenberg's Harmonielehre is in the area of style and diction. Both 
the diatribe and Schoenberg's text are characterized by the frequent use 
of paratactic construction (the omission of traditional connectives), and 
the stringing together of short, conversational sentences8 as we find in 
the following section: 
But what then can we do with the g #? How is that to find 
a place in the system? As if the system had to be built up 
by thirds alonel Why not by fifths, which are indeed more 
immediate than thirds? Why built 'up' in the first place? 
Perhaps sounds, too, have three dimensions, perhaps even 
more! All right!9 
In the diatribe, these features served to make a stronger impression on 
an audience, perhaps through enhanced vividness. Shock value is also 
a possible motive for such phraseology: an audience might concentrate 
on a speaker's artistic use of the language, but use of parataxis and 
common speech might encourage more attention to the content of what 
is said. 10 
Another factor that contributes to vividness, a factor common to 
the diatribe and Harmonielehre, is the use of audience contact. The 
7Stanley Kent Stowers, The Diatribe and Paul's Letter to the Romans, SBL 
Dissertation Series no. 57, series editor William Baird (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 
1981), 7-78. 
8Stowers, The Diatribe and Paul's Letter, 21. 
9Theory of Harmony, 321. "Was ist aber erst mit dem gis? Wie ist das im System 
unterzubringen? Als ob das System just auf Terzen aufgebaut sein miiBte! Warum nicht 
auf Quinten, die ja naher liegen als Terzen? Warum iiberhaupt "auf"gebaut? Vielleicht 
haben die Klange auch drei Dimensionen, vielleicht sogar mehr! Aber Gut! ' , 
Harmonielehre, 388. 
lOS towers , The Diatribe and Paul's Letter, 21. 
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audience may be sympathetic, or it may be hostile, as in the section 
which follows the preceding quotation: 
'I don't know what to do with it' -that doesn't bother me. 
You simply have to admit it! ... Confess: 'because 1 don't 
know what to do with it!' Then we shall be good friends. 
But the pretense must stop. 11 
Sometimes, this topos takes the form of questions or statements from 
an imaginary interlocutor, as in the earlier quotation dealing with the 
question of beauty, or in a later passage dealing with passing tones. 12 
The purpose of this device seems to be to encourage audience 
participation, if not in a literal sense, at least in the sense of a close 
following of the speaker's argument. 13 
Finally, the dialogical element forms the strongest parallel 
between this text and the diatribe. As stated before, there are several 
long sections in the form of (sometimes partially submerged) dialogues 
between Schoenberg and his opponent. This similarity helps to account 
for the problems in relating the structure of the discourse to more 
traditional, easily outlined forms. The back-and-forth structure of some 
parts of the text parallels the means by which the diatribe's structure 
unfolds; the logic of each section does not proceed step-by-step in 
hierarchical fashion, but by question and answer, statement and reply. 14 
Thus, the sections of Chapter 17 that appear to interrupt any kind of 
llTheory of Harmony, 321. "Mit dem ich nichts Rechtes anzufangen weiS, 
meinetwegen. Das muS du gestehen! . . . Bekenne, 'weil ich nichts Rechtes damit 
anzufangen weiB!' dann wollte wir gute Freunde sein. Aber die AnmaBung muS 
aufhoren." Harmonielehre, 389. 
12In this last example, the exchange employs the formula, "Man wird entwenden 
... Ich sage ... " ("Somebody will object ... I shall reply ... "); Harmonielehre, 
390; Theory of Harmony, 322. This closely resembles some formulas which appear in 
the diatribe (see Stowers, The Diatribe and Paul's Letter, 23). 
13Stowers, The Diatribe and Paul's Letter, 21. 
14Ibid. 
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systematic argument and break the flow of the discourse may actually 
be regarded as interruptions by a fictitious-in the sense of not actually 
present - opponent. 
If the diatribe was a didactic form in the Socratic tradition, as 
Stowers believes, then our understanding of Schoenberg's Chapter 17 
may benefit from the comparison. The reason for his using elements of 
this form may indeed have been "not simply to impart knowledge, but 
to transform the students, to point out error and to cure it, "15 and the 
demeaning references to the opposition are "not an aspect of real 
inquiry, but an attempt to expose specific errors in thought . . . so that 
the student can be led to another doctrine of life. "16 
Problems of Expository Language 
But what place does anything that is not either in the spirit of 
straightforward description or "real inquiry" have in a technical 
treatise on harmony? Actually, this question betrays a fundamental 
misunderstanding of what actually goes on in a harmony book-or 
indeed in the technical literature of any discipline -and the hinge on 
which this misunderstanding turns is the mostly illusory distinction 
between demonstration and persuasion. 
Stanley Fish has observed that, in order for the activity of 
demonstration to exist, we must have access to a body of facts that 
exists independently of interpretation of those facts.1? Demonstration 
thus means presenting the facts in an orderly fashion so as to confirm 
or refute a theory, with the concomitant assumptions of 
disinterestedness, purity of motive and freedom from bias on the part 
of the demonstrator. Demonstration defines knowledge, like the facts 
it observes and describes, as being independent and unmediated by 
15Ibid., 76. 
16Ibid., 77. 
17Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1980), 365. 
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point of view. 18 It also seems to require, if not a tabula rasa for an 
audience, at least the same freedom from preconceptions on the part of 
those to whom something is demonstrated. Furthermore, true 
demonstration requires the use of a language which is also free from 
preconceptions, presumably after the fashion of mathematics, with its 
recourse to terms and operators which require only manipulation, not 
interpretation. 
The common idea of persuasion is the use of language to swing 
opinion. Not present in this definition is the constraint placed upon 
demonstration, that facts are simply to be exhibited and allowed to 
speak for themselves. Also absent is the assumption, again present in 
demonstration, that truth is the goal. Persuasion is allowed the luxury 
of twisting facts in whatever way the persuader prefers, a state reflected 
in Strepsiades' lines, "So teach him both kinds of logic: the better, 
such as it is, and the worse, which can defeat the better with improper 
methods; or at least by all means teach him the worse kind." 
(Aristophanes, The Clouds, lines 882-885).19 Persuasion is thus 
generally regarded as tainted, characterized by manipulation of facts 
through the manipulation of language. 
Now the question arises: do we ever have access to a body of 
facts in such a way as is assumed in the definition of demonstration? 
More importantly, are we ever able to do anything with these facts 
without imparting our own biases into them, thereby giving them some 
additional content, or even depriving them of some? For demonstration 
to be possible, the demonstrator must be able to operate with no set of 
beliefs or opinions about that which is to be demonstrated. Fish has 
shown that it is never possible to function in this way; there is always 
a set of beliefs already in place.20 Perhaps more to the point is the 
18Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1989),474. 
19The Works of Aristophanes in Three Volumes, trans. Benj. Bickley Rogers, Loeb 
Classical Library (London: Wm. Heinemann, 1927), 344. I have used my own 
translation in order to clarify what is obscured by the versification in Rogers' translation. 
2Opish, DOing What Comes Naturally, 365. 
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recognition that, in any discipline, the terms we use in our theoretical 
explanations to describe why are only distinguished from the terms we 
use to describe what by the way we think about them. 21 We never have 
recourse to a "neutral observation language,' '22 an unbiased means of 
simple description, since "description can occur only within a 
stipulative understanding of what there is to be described, an 
understanding that will produce the object of its attention.' ,23 Thus the 
question of the difference between observation and theory, between 
demonstration and persuasion, turns out simply to be a question of what 
we believe we are doing. It turns out that in either case we are 
manipulating interpretations rather than facts. 
The question posed at the beginning of this section, the question 
of what place a chapter like Schoenberg's Chapter 17 has in a book on 
harmonic theory, now shows itself to be the wrong question. The 
question should rather be: Why doesn't this sort of discourse appear 
more often in such texts? The answer would seem to be that authors 
may not be aware of the intensely rhetorical nature of their own texts. 
Perhaps they believe their task is to demonstrate rather than to 
persuade, hence the prevailing clinical tone of many works in music 
theory. 
Schoenberg's Musical Examples 
21Paul K. Peyerabend, "Introduction to vols. 1 and 2," Realism, Rationalism and 
Scientific Method: Philosophical Papers, Vol. I (Cambridge: University Press, 1981), x, 
n3. See also Peyerabend, "Consolations for the Specialist," in Criticism and the Growth 
of Knowledge, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge: University Press, 
1970), 224-25. 
22 A term used by Thomas Kuhn in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(Chicago: University Press, 1970), 125. 
23pish, Doing What Comes Naturally, 353. 
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A significant component of any attempt at persuasion is the 
support adduced for the argument. In the part of Chapter 17 in which 
the question of beauty is addressed, two excerpts - one from the music 
of J. S. Bach, one from the music of Mozart-serve to illustrate 
Schoenberg's points. The first, Example 232 from Harmonielehre, is 
taken from mm. 14, 41 and 43 of Bach's Motet No.5, Komm, Jesu, 
komm (misdocumented in the text, according to Carter24): 
Example 1. Schoenberg's Example 232 from Harmonielehre 
," 
" L I 
Bach, Motets. 
I 
232 
til 11'· UII r ~ br · t ED 
.J b~ ~ ED 
f 
",b ... 
-
--
. 
I 
Arnold Schoenberg. Theory of Hannony. Ed. and trans. Roy 
Carter. Copyright (c) 1978 Faber and Faber. U sed by 
permIssIOn. 
The portion of the text in which this example is situated is one of the 
most heavily ironic passages in what is already an ironic chapter. In 
addition to the comments quoted above, Schoenberg claims to have 
been troubled by the fact that even the greatest composers have written 
ugly chords such as these; there is an implicit reprimand of Bach for 
disregarding his education, using his imagination and putting himself 
above the theorists by producing such sounds. 25 
Schoenberg later requotes Bach's music in his Example 234, this 
time in the larger context of three full measures from the motet, and 
here the tone of the surrounding text is not quite so ironic. His 
24Theory of Harmony, 327, nl. 
25Harmonieiehre, 392; Theory of Harmony, 324. 
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requotation guards against the hostile reader's forgetting the points he 
began to make when he first made the quotation, and it also enables the 
emphasis of further points concerning the irrelevance of the passing 
origin of the sounds. He concludes that Bach must have considered the 
sounds beautiful, since he could have avoided the sounds if he had 
wanted to. At the very least, they will not be considered as musical 
shortcomings on the basis of their sound. 26 
In his Example 233, Schoenberg refers to two versions of a chord 
from the development section of the first movement of Mozart's 
Symphony No. 40: 
Example 2. Schoenberg's Example 233 from Harmonielehre 
Arnold Schoenberg. Theory of Harmony. Ed. and trans. Roy 
Carter. Copyright (c) 1978 Faber and Faber. U sed by 
permISSIOn. 
Again, the surrounding text is ironic (but less so than in the case of the 
Bach example, discussed above), and contains references to the opinion 
of the theorists that, "with his talent, such writing really wasn't 
necessary. ,,27 I shall return to the matter of this necessity momentarily. 
Several questions pertaining to the use of such examples arise, the 
first being that of the propriety of conceiving of these musical entities 
as chords and citing them as such. What is behind this question is the 
idea of the horizontal and the vertical dimensions of music, and which 
26Harmonielehre, 396-97; Theory of Harmony, 327-28. 
27Theory of Harmony, 325. " ... was er bei seinem Talent ja wirklich nicht notig 
hatte." Harmonielehre, 393. 
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of these dimensions should receive priority. It seems that Schoenberg 
preferred the priority of the vertical, at least for the purposes at hand 
in this chapter of Harmonielehre. Even though he often speaks of the 
mutual influence of harmony and melody, 28 we still find references to 
"mere voice-leading, which might be, to a limited extent, a secondary 
task of harmony teaching.' '29 Bearing his attitude in mind, we might 
well ask whether it is appropriate to quote these phenomena as chords, 
since citation in this form ignores the contrapuntal origins and 
dependent natures of the sonorities. Schoenberg thinks to exonerate 
himself from this charge by giving us a "context" of three measures 
in the Bach example and one-half measure in the Mozart. This does not 
change the accompanying citations of the sonorities with equalized 
voices, however. In the Bach quotation (such as it is), the chords are 
given the value of a quarter note, but in the score, some of the notes 
are given longer values while others indeed have the quarter-note value 
(see Example 1 above). On the other hand, the Mozart example 
presents an appoggiatura of an eighth-note's duration inflated to the 
value of a half note (see Example 2). These citations clearly ignore 
important contrapuntal aspects of the "chords" they supposedly cite; 
some of the tones in the Bach example are plainly of greater weight 
than others, and the notes of the appoggiatura in the Mozart example 
are obviously dependent on the notes of the sonority which they 
precede. Thus, in putting the notes of these passages in this equalized 
form, has not Schoenberg effectively purged them of any reason for 
existence? 
The problem with the foregoing discussion is that it ignores an 
important aspect of Schoenberg's thought, and it is here that I return to 
the idea of musical necessity. It appears that he thinks of voice leading 
in a way that resembles the description of motion in Zeno' s paradox of 
the arrow. 30 That is, in order for an object to be in motion, it must at 
28For example, see Harmonielehre, 27ff; Theory of Harmony, 26ff. 
29"[denn daraus lemt er] bloB Stimmfiihrung, was, in beschdinktem MaBe, eine 
Nebenaufgabe der Harmonielehre sein k6nnte." Harmonielehre, 9. 
30 Aristotle, Physics, VI, 9, 30. 
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any instant be in a particular spot. Where it is now depends on where 
it was a moment ago, and where it will be a moment from now depends 
on where it is at this moment. The resemblance of Schoenberg's 
opinions on voice leading can be seen in the following excerpt from 
Chapter 17: 
We can dismiss as accidental the fact that such and such a 
man was passing below when a tile fell from the roof 
(although even that is not necessarily accidental, but can be 
predetermined). However, we can no longer dismiss as 
accidental the fact that he who is passing just at the decisive 
moment is the one hit by the tile; for if the tile falls 
(perhaps by chance), then it is no longer by chance, it is 
rather entirely in conformity with law that he will be hit, 
and no one can expect it to be otherwise. Hence the 
cooperation of two chance occurrences can produce 
something completely predictable, completely in conformity 
with law. Now we should consider yet another point: that 
the tile fell is accidental only, if at all, relative to the 
misfortune it produced. But not in itself. For its falling was 
the necessary consequence of two causes: on the one hand, 
the carelessness of the person who should have made it 
secure, and on the other, the law of gravity. Moreover, the 
fact that the man was passing below is no accident: he had 
to go this way for some reason; and, since he was walking 
at a certain tempo, he who previously was so far away 
from the scene of the future misfortune had to be there just 
at the decisive moment. 31 
Here we have an expression, in the form of an extended metaphor, of 
Schoenberg's belief in the contingent nature of each musical moment. 
Every musical action a composer takes will have consequences; what 
happens in moment y depends on what happened in moment x, just as 
31 Theory of Harmony, 310. I will not quote the German, since I am here dealing 
with the thought contained in the text rather than the manner of the thought's expression. 
14 Indiana Theory Review Vol. 15/2 
moment y helps predetermine what will happen in moment z. Each 
"independent" voice moves from point to point; some points are more 
important than others, and some less important points precede, hence 
determine, the more important (as in the Mozart example). Many 
voices sounding together may produce a sound that is the result of more 
and less important points, and the resulting sound may be more or less 
important than the sounds which precede or follow it. The composite 
sound is the sum of all of these determinate and determining points, 
these "independently moving voices." But what is independent (of the 
other voices) has been shown to be dependent (on its own previous 
activity). Thus Schoenberg has provided a virtual deconstruction of the 
concept of independent voices. From such a point of view, it is not at 
all against musical sense to cite portions of music in the way he does. 
A related question - perhaps a less practical one - is what bearing 
the notion of musical context has on citation. Examination of this 
question easily brushes up against the further question of the similarity 
of musical context to literary context, or, to put it in Derridean terms, 
the musical mark to the grammatological mark. It is worth considering 
whether the musical mark/work "cuts itself off from [the 
sender/composer] and continues to produce effects independently of his 
presence and of the present actuality of his intentions.' '32 Often this 
appears to be the case; it may well always be the case. We might posit 
a continuum of effects, some closer to the composer's intention (such 
as the performer's interpretation of a work - a French pianist 
performing Moussorgsky so that it sounds like French music), and 
some farther from it (using a Bach two-part invention to help sell cars). 
Analytical articles dealing with a musical work are probably not part 
of the composer's intention, nor is inclusion of musical excerpts in a 
treatise on harmony. It nevertheless is the case that the moment from 
the Bach motet quoted in Example 1 prompted aspects of a section of 
Schoenberg's text, just as did the two eighth notes from Mozart's 
fortieth symphony prompt aspects of a section. The kind of use to 
which these excerpts are put in Harmonielehre may have been farther 
32 Jacques Derrida, "Signature Event Context," Glyph 1 ( 1977): 177. 
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than the farthest thing from their minds, but we still have Bach and 
Mozart speaking to us from within the Schoenberg text. 
But there may be a reciprocal effect: the effect of the quotation 
on the music. For example, I will never again listen to the development 
section of Mozart's fortieth without thinking of the treatment those two 
chords receive in Harmonielehre. I will make every effort to hear the 
two appoggiatura chords that Schoenberg cites in the way that he cites 
them: as minor-major seventh chords; and I will do this no matter how 
I feel about the appropriateness of the citation. I will listen to this piece 
in this special way, in spite of my knowledge that every other work in 
the Kochel catalogue has similar sonorities to which I will not attach a 
similar significance. After all, the fortieth has the chord that appeared 
in Schoenberg's book! 
This effect of citation on music is similar to a related 
phenomenon in literary studies: 
A literary text is a texture of words, its threads and 
filaments reaching into the pre-existing warp and woof of 
the language. The critic adds his weaving to the Penelope's 
web of the text, or unravels it so that its structuring threads 
may be laid bare, or reweaves it, or traces out one thread 
in the text to reveal the design it inscribes, or cuts the 
whole cloth to one shape or another. In some way the critic 
necessarily does violence of [sic] the text in the act of 
understanding it or of interpreting it. There is no innocent 
reading, no reading which leaves the work exactly as it is. 33 
To bring this closer to the subject at hand, there is no way to cite a 
musical example which does not in some way "violate" the original. 
Whether or not we take the view that such examples, divorced from 
their original context (whatever that may mean), continue ever 
thereafter to hurtle through the universe like comets and collide with 
33J. Hillis Miller, Thomas Hardy: Distance and Desire (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap/Harvard, 1970), viii. 
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new contexts-this study, possibly-it may indeed have been impossible 
for Schoenberg to quote Mozart and Bach in any way that left the 
works exactly as they were. 
Just as the questions which prompted this article formed the basis 
for the questions which are actually addressed, I hope that the questions 
here addressed will produce more, and better, questions. The matter of 
expository language, for instance, could form the basis for a study of 
the history of literary style in the genre of the harmony treatise. The 
matter of musical excerpt quotation could form the basis for a study of 
the metaphysics of presence in music. I hope for a much more direct 
result, too, however: to promote a greater appreciation for 
Schoenberg's Harmonielehre from a literary standpoint. As a technical 
treatise it will always be peculiar; for one reason or another, it may not 
always be very useful for the study of harmony. But as a work of 
literature it deserves much more attention than I can give it here, and 
as a means of understanding Schoenberg's thought, it is indispensable. 
